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FEDERAL VERSUS STATE JURISDICTION
OVER STRANGER PICKETING
A perplexing question in contemporary labor law is whether Congress, in
passing the Taft-Hartley Act,' pre-empted the entire field of labor relations in
interstate commerce and thereby excluded all state regulation in that field.2 This
note will be confined to the pre-emption argument in one of the areas of greatest
confusion, stranger picketing for organization and recognition.3 The subsidiary
question of whether pre-emption operates in all areas subject to the NLRB's
statutory jurisdiction or only in areas over which it normally assumes jurisdic-
tion will not be discussed here. 4
Under the Taft-Hartley Act as presently interpreted, union activity may
constitute an unfair labor practice under Section 8,1 a protected activity under
Section 7,1 or fall within a middle group of activities which are neither prohibited
nor protected by the Act. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Plankinton
Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board apparently holds that
state jurisdiction over activities which constitute Section 8 unfair labor prac-
tices has been pre-empted.7 Other Supreme Court decisions have established
161 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. (Supp., 1951).
2 Smith, The Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations, 46 Mich. L.
Rev. 593 (1948); Cox and Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 211
(1950); Petro, State Jurisdiction To Control Recognition Picketing, 2 Lab. L.J. 883 (1951);
State Jurisdiction To Enjoin Picketing Affecting Interstate Commerce: Extent of Exclusive
Jurisdiction of NLRB, 37 Cornell L.Q. 515 (1952).
3 The two objectives are here deliberately combined as they are, practically speaking, on
the picket line. The cases, however, necessitate a distinction. See p. 110 infra. Minority picket-
ing is unlike stranger picketing in that it involves picketing by employeey, not outsiders. But
where the objective of the picketing is organization of the employees and recognition from the
employer, minority picketing presents the essential problem of stranger picketing with the
important tactical difference that the employer can discharge the minority but not the stranger
pickets. Whether such a discharge would constitute an unfair labor practice depends on wheth-
er the picketing is a protected activity under Section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act. This question
is considered in the body of the present discussion in relation to stranger picketing. No decision
has been found which clearly differentiates between stranger picketing for organization and
recognition and minority picketing for the same purpose. Grounds for such a differentiation
are adumbrated in NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F. 2d 199 (C.A. 4th, 1944). See Cox, The
Right To Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 Ind. L.J. 319, 331-32 (1951).
4 See Feldblum, Jurisdictional "Tidelands" in Labor Relations, 38 Va. L. Rev. 187 (1952).
5 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (Supp., 1951).
6 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (Supp., 1951).
7338 U.S. 953 (1950); cf. Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 167 F. 2d 183
(C.A. 4th, 1948). For an explanation of the meaning of the cryptic Plankinton decision, see
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that the states may not regulate conduct which constitutes protected activity
under Section 7.8 The as yet unresolved question is the extent of state jurisdic-
tion over the middle group of activities.9 Although the Taft-Hartley Act neither
prohibits nor protects such activities, it may be argued that Congress, by enact-
ing a comprehensive regulation of labor relations in interstate commerce, in-
tended to "occupy" that entire field and thereby excluded state regulation even
in the middle area.10 The argument is particularly germane to stranger picketing
since such picketing, as the following discussion will show, has not been clearly
prohibited or protected by the Act."
Any discussion of stranger picketing will be further complicated by the fact
that some courts have drawn a distinction between picketing for recognition and
picketing for organization which has important consequences for the pre-
emption arguments. 2 Picketing for recognition has been enjoined on the ground
that its objective is the unlawful one of forcing the employer to coerce his em-
ployees to accept an unwanted union as their bargaining representative. But
organizational picketing is said to involve only a demand upon the employees
to joint the union and not to be directed at employer coercion of employees. 13
Since the courts which make this distinction do not hold the organizational
picketing to be unlawful coercion of the employees, placards which exhort
"Join us!" may be legal while those which read "Recognize us!" invite injunc-
tions. 4
The distinction between picketing for recognition and picketing for organiza-
tion is unrealistic. The resultant pressure on and harm to the employer and his
Cox and Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 211, 220-21 (1950).
There is considerable doubt that the doctrine will be applied to violent activity even though
such activity is an unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(1)(A), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 158(b)(1)(A) (Supp., 1951). See Petro, State Jurisdiction to Regulate Violent Picketing,
3 Lab. L.J. 3 (1952).
8Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945); International Union, UAW, AFL v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board (hereafter called Briggs-Stratton), 336 U.S. 245 (1949); United
Automobile Workers, CIO v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950); Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Ry.
Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (hereafter called Bus Employees),
340 U.S. 383 (1951).
9 See, e.g., Goodwins v. Hagedorn, 303 N.Y. 300, 101 N.E. 2d 697 (1951), rehearing denied,
303 N.Y. 673, 102 N.E. 2d 833 (1951).
10 See discussion p. 116 infra.
1 This note will not deal with the substantive state law of stranger and minority picketing.
The states differ on the legality of such picketing and the decisions result from an interplay of
common-law, statutory and constitutional doctrines. Peaceful Picketing to Force Employees to
Join Union or to Compel Employer to Enter into a Contract Which Would in Effect Compel
Them to Do So, 11 A.L.R. 2d 1338 (1950).
12 Park & Tilford Import Corp. v. Local 848, AFL, 165 P. 2d 891, 896 (1946); Peters v.
Central Labor Council, 169 P. 2d 870, 875-76 (1946); Wolferman v. Root, 204 S.W. 2d 733,
735 (Mo. App., 1947); Building Service Employees v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 539-40 (1950);
Goodwins v. Hagedorn, 21 CCH Lab. Cas. 66,893 (N.Y. S. Ct., 1952).
13 See, e.g., Goodwins v. Hagedorn, 21 CCH Lab. Cas. 66, 893 (N.Y.S. Ct., 1952).
14 Authoritiescited note 12 supra.
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employees is precisely the same whether the picketing is said to be for one pur-
pose or the other. If the legality of stranger picketing be made to turn on the
avowed purpose of the picketing, the union need merely change the rhetoric of
its placards to legalize its conduct. Nor would a union find it difficult to justify
its use of organizational rhetoric even though its ultimate objective were recog-
nition. This is so because a union's status is not finally secure until it becomes a
bona fide majority union, since the employer who recognizes a stranger or mi-
nority union runs a risk of subjecting himself to an NLRB cease and desist
order which will prevent dealings with the union until it obtains an uncoerced
majority."6 Organization as well as recognition must therefore be a union objec-
tive, and any outlawing of stranger picketing ought to proceed on a theory of
coercion of the employer and of the employees, regardless of whether the stated
purpose of the picketing be recognition or organization.
But the organization-recognition distinction, however unrealistic it may be,
has been accepted by some courts, and attention will have to be directed to its
consequences throughout the following discussion. Perhaps it ought to be
noted, by way of oblique justification of the courts, that the Taft-Hartley Act
itself appears to distinguish the two types of picketing. Section 8(b) (4) (C),'6
which prescribes picketing for recognition in the face of an outstanding certi-
fication, is limited by its language to recognition activities only. Organizational
picketing is covered, if at all, by a separate section, 8(b)(1)(A). 17
I
Under a literal construction of Section 8(b) (1) (A) picketing for organization
appears to be an unfair labor practice: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 7."1 8 One of the rights so guaranteed is the right
to refrain from joining a labor union. The NLRB has, however, not interpreted
Section 8(b)(1)(A) as proscribing organizational activity.
The first NLRB decision interpreting Section 8(b)(1)(A), Maritime Union of
America,19 involved a majority strike for a hiring-hall contract. The Board, re-
lying on the legislative history of the section, concluded that Congress intended
to eliminate only physical violence, intimidation, and the use by unions of
threats of economic action against specific individuals to compel them to join.
Since the strike in the Maritime case involved no violence, was directed against
the employer, not against employees, and could not have been an attempt to
force any specific individuals to join because all employees were already union
members, the Board held that the strike did not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A).
15 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, at § 8(a)( 2), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 8(a)(2) (Supp., 1951). See Midwest Piping and Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945).
1 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(4)(C) (Supp., 1951).
17 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(1)(A) (Supp., 1951).
1s 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(1)(A) (Supp., 1951).
19 78 N.L.R.B. 971 (1948).
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Nonetheless the hiring-hall contract sought by the union would in practice
have discriminated against nonmembers and would have forced prospective em-
ployees to join the union as a practical prerequisite to employment. Board
member Gray accordingly dissented on the ground that this sort of coercion
constituted a violation of Section 8(b)(1) (A) .2 But a majority of the Board ap-
parently felt that coercion of prospective employees was too remote to come
within the ban of the section.2 ' The majority indicated, however, that the result
might be opposite where the coercion was directed at present, not merely
prospective, employees, and where its primary purpose was to compel employ-
ees to join the union and not, as in the Maritime case, to gain a particular kind of
contract.'
In two later cases, where the economic coercion was in fact aimed at forcing
specific persons, already employees, to become or remain members of the union,
the Board did hold that such coercion violated Section 8(b)(1)(A). In Clara-Val
Packing Co. a threat to strike for the purpose of forcing the employer to dis-
charge an employee who would not join the union was held to constitute an
independent violation of both Sections 8(b) (1) (A) and 8(b) (2).13 A similar result
obtained in Pinkerton's National Detective Agency, 24 which involved a strike for
the purpose of forcing the employer to discharge employees who refused to pay
their union dues. It is important to note that the Board has held that a violation
of 8(b)(1)(A) may not be found as a mere consequence of a violation of another
section.2 5 Clara-Val and Pinkerton's therefore stand for the proposition that a
union violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) when it seeks to coerce specific employees to
join or remain members of the union by a peaceful strike or by a threat to
strike." The differences between such conduct and stranger picketing for or-
20 Ibid., at 993-94.
21 Or perhaps they felt that possible coercion (because the objective of the strike was not
attained) of prospective employees was too remote. Had the strike been successful and had the
hiring hall contract been signed, the union might then have been guilty of violating § 8(b) (1)
(A). New York State Employers Association, 93 N.L.R.B. 127, 129 (1951).
' "The touchstone of a strike which is violative of Section 8(b) (1) (A) is normally the means
by which it is accomplished, so long as its objective is directly related to the interests of the
strikers, and not directed primarily at compelling other employees to forego the rights whicl Sec-
tion 7 protects.... [Tlhis strike, though violative of Section 8(b) (2), had as its prime objective
the protection of the employment interests of NMU members, and not the coercing of non-
members to join the union." (Emphasis partly added.) 78 N.L.R.B. 971, 986 (1948).
23 Clara-Val Packing Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 703, 705 (1949). See also Union Starch and Refining
Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 779, 787 (1949); N.Y. Shipbuilding Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 1446 (1950); General
American Aerocoach Corp., 90 N.L.R.B. 239 (1950).
2490 N .L.R.B. 205 (1950).
21Nat'l Maritime Union, 78 N.L.R.B. 976, 985-86 (1948); Carpenters and Joiners, 80
N.L.R.B. 533, 539 (1948).
26 In an earlier decision the Board had apparently construed the legislative history of
Section 8(b)(1)(A) more narrowly than it did in the Maritime case and decided that it was
"intended to proscribe only the coercive conduct which sometimes accompanies a strike but not
the strike itself." Perry Norwell Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 225, 239 (1948). Such an interpretation,
which would have immunized all peaceful picketing from Section 8(b)(1)(A), seems clearly
inconsistent with the later Clara-Val and Pinkerton's decisions.
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ganization are slight-the weapon in the latter case is picketing, not striking,
and the employees against whom the coercion is directed are more numerous,
generally ali the employees in a plant.
The Board has held, however, in its only decision to date on stranger picket-
ing for organization, United Brotherhood Carpenters and Joiners,27 that such
picketing does not constitute an unfair labor practice under Section 8(b)(1)(A).
The defendant union picketed a store where only nonunion employees worked.
The Board found "that the picketing of Watson's by Local 74 ... was for the
purpose of inducing, directly or indirectly, the workers.., to join the union,"2s
but it held that the picketing was merely "persuasive" and not "coercive" and
accordingly did not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A). 29 It is not clear whether the
Board's theory was that peaceful picketing alone cannot be coercive, or that the
picketing in Carpenters and Joiners was not coercive because it was ineffective. 30
The Board has further complicated the status of stranger picketing by
tacitly accepting the organization-recognition distinction in a series of recent
decisions in cases involving employer petitions for elections. It was held in
Hubach and Parkinson Motors,3" for example, that picketing is not inconsistent
with a disclaimer of majority status and that elections would not be ordered
where there had been such a disclaimer. The Board said, "We regard it [the
picketing] only as an attempt by the Union... to organize the employees of the
employer and thereby seek to regain its former status as a majority representa-
tive."" Evidently it was not contended that the picketing constituted a viola-
tion of Section 8(b)(1)(A), and so it is difficult to estimate precisely the effect of
this and like decisions on stranger picketing as an unfair labor practice. 3
The legislative history of Section 8(b)(1)(A) is inconclusive as to whether
Congress intended to make stranger picketing an unfair labor practice. In dis-
27 80 N.L.R.B. 533 (1948). 28 Ibid., at 547.
29 "The picketing was a method employed by Local 74 to publicize the fact that Watson
did not employ union labor, on the theory that some potential customers would not patronize
such an establishment, and with the hope that such activity would induce the... employees
to join the Union; but ... any such effect on said employees was persuasive and not coercive."
Ibid., at 549.
30 "It is assumed... that at least some of the... employees, aware that the advertising
[picketing] was having an adverse effect on the business of their employer, considered the eco-
nomic advantage of joining the Union. This is not to say that, because the picketing brought
some results in loss of business to the employer, it follows that the employees, in order to pro-
tect their jobs, were forced to join the Union, especially where no threats were involved. In
the case before us it is noted that it actually had no such effect.., as there is no evidence
that any of Watson's employees joined the Union. The most that can be said in that respect is
that the picketing was intended to demonstrate to the non-union workers that it was to their
advantage to become union members. It did not constitute restraint or coercion of those em-
ployees in the exercise of rights guaranteed under the Act, nor did it have that effect." Ibid.,
at 547. Query: Would the result have been the same had the "advertising" been so effective
that Watson's was forced to close?
"188 N.L.R.B. 1202 (1950). Ibid., at 1204.
3' See also, Bur-Bee Co. 90 N.L.R.B. 9 (1950); Smith's Hardware Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1009
(1951); Hamilton's Ltd., 93 N.L.R.B. 1076 (1951); General Paint Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. No. 68
(1951). Compare, Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 1063 (1948). See, for a discussion of the
cases, Petro, Recognition of Picketing under the NLRA, 2 Lab. L.J. 803, 804-5 (1951).
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cussing the section, Senators Taft and Ball constantly referred to threats of
violence, mass picketing, "goonsters," etc.34 It might be inferred from such
recurrent references that the section was intended to cover only physical as
distinguished from economic coercion. But each Senator referred to at least one
clear case of peaceful stranger picketing for organization as an abuse which the
section would correct,35 and Senator Morse apparently shared this view.3" The
legislative history thus can be invoked to support either view of the scope of
Section 8(b)(1)(A), but since the NLRB has apparently abandoned interpreta-
tions which restrict the scope 3f the section to violent or threatening activity,3 7
there no longer appears to be any rational ground for distinguishing between
stranger picketing for organization and the Clara-Val and Pinkerton's situa-
tions. To date, however, the Carpenters and Joiners decision has not been
overruled.3 8
II
Assuming that stranger picketing is not a Taft-Hartley unfair labor practice
(save, of course, that which violates Section 8(b) (4) (C)), and that state jurisdic-
tion over it is not, therefore, pre-empted by the Plankinton doctrine, the next
possibility is that stranger picketing is a protected activity under Section 7 of
the Taft-Hartley Act. A holding to this effect would preclude state jurisdiction
over such picketing on grounds of conflict with federal law.39
Under judicial and Board interpretation of Section 7 there are several classes
of labor activity which, though in fact concerted, have been held unprotected
by the section.4 These include concerted activities in violation of some federal
or state statute of general applicability (not restricted to labor-management re-
lations)," and concerted activities in breach of contract.4 Also included is a
34 See, e.g., 93 Cong. Rec. 4017, 4021 (1947).
Senator Taft: "We had a case last year where a union went to a plant in California and
said, 'We want to organize your employees. Call them in and tell them to join our union.'
The employers said, 'We have not any control over our employees. We cannot tell them, under
the NLRA.' They said, 'If you don't we will picket your plant'; and they did picket it, and
closed it down for a couple of months. Coercion is not merely against union members; it may
be against all employees." Ibid., at 4024. And see Senator Ball's relation of a similar incident,
ibid., at 4017.
36 Ibid., at 4430. 37 See note 26 supra.
38 Where employees had voted in a National Board election against joining the pick-
eting union, one federal court held stranger picketing for organization to be a violation of
§ 8(b) (1) (A). Pocahontas Terminal Corp. v. Portland Bldg. Constr. Trade Council, 93 F. Supp.
217 (S.D. Me., 1950).
39 See note 8 supra.
40 For a general discussion, see Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 Ind.
L.J. 319 (1951).
4 Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1940). It has been suggested that state statutes
which do no more than fix the outside limits of the collective bargain also belong in the cate-
gory. Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 Ind. L.J. 319, 341-43 (1951).
4NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
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class of cases involving the use of tactics other than an ordinary strike or picket-
ing, for example, the sit-down strike,43 the "quickie" strike,44 the slowdown,45
and various kinds of insubordination." Stranger picketing, however, if peaceful,
does not violate any non-labor law and need not violate any contract. Nor does
it appear to fall within the class of the unusual tactics cases, since it utilizes only
the traditional device of peaceful picketing.
In another group of cases, however, the protection of Section 7 was withheld
from labor activity which could not attain its objective unless the employer
violated a federal law or state statute of general applicability,47 or committed
an unfair labor practice.48 On this latter ground, concerted activity for recogni-
tion while certification proceedings are pending before the NLRB has been de-
nied protection because the employer's compliance with the union's demand
would constitute interference with his employees' choice of representatives and
thus amount to an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a)(2). 41 Whether the
same result would be reached absent the certification proceedings is conjectural,
though the Supreme Court in the recent Gazzam case 0 (which did not involve
interstate commerce) refused to strike down a state court's use of the interfer-
ence with employees rationale where there was not even a rival union on the
scene. Little reason appears for refusing to apply this rationale to all cases in
which the union seeking recognition is not a majority union.5 But the Gazzam
decision carefully noted that the Court was confronted with recognition and not
organizational picketing and thereby emphasized that the cases which declare
recognition picketing unprotected by Section 7 are not necessarily precedents
for organizational picketing cases. 2
There is, however, a last possibility for holding organizational stranger
picketing unprotected by Section 7. The NLRB has said that "where the objec-
tives sought were inconsistent with the terms or the clearly enunciated policy
43 NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
"Briggs-Stratton, 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
46 Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950).
4 See, e.g., NLRB v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 147 F. 2d 262 (C.A. 6th, 1945); NLRB v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F. 2d 486 (C.A. 8th, 1946).
,7 See, e.g., American News Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944).
48 Thompson Products Inc., 70 N.L.R.B. 13 (1946), vacated 72 N.L.R.B. 886 (1947).
49 Hoover Co. v. NLRB, 191 F. 2d 380 (C.A. 6th, 1951); Goodwins v. Hagedorn, 303 N.Y.
300, 101 N.E. 2d 697 (1951).
60 Building Service Employees v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950).
51 Where a union is certified, or where there is no certification but one union clearly has
majority status, the employer's duty to bargain with the majority union is said to carry with
it the negative duty to recognize and bargain with no other. Medo Photo Supply Corp. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
Picketing for recognition by a minority or stranger union could therefore be declared unpro-
tected because its objective was to coerce the employer to violate this duty. But where there
is no majority union, this explanation will not do, and the § 8(a)(2) rationale must be used.
"Building Service Employees v. Gazzan, 339 U.S. 532, 539-40 (1950).
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of this Act [Taft-Hartley]," the activity might be excepted from the coverage of
Section 7.53 Applying this criterion, which probably explains the breach of con-
tract cases,54 it could be argued that one of the fundamental objectives of the
Taft-Hartley Act is to encourage collective bargaining between employers and
unions representing free, uncoerced majorities of the employees; that election
procedure for selecting employee representatives has been provided; that one
of the objectives of stranger picketing is to bypass this procedure and ccerce
workers into a choice of representatives; and that consequently such picketing
violates a fundamental policy of the Act and should not be designated a pro-
tected activity.55 But no case has been found which clearly applies this reason-
ing to organizational picketing.
III
Even if stranger picketing for organization should be declared unprotected as
well as not prohibited by the Taft-Hartley Act, doubt would still exist as to
whether the states could constitutionally assume jurisdiction over such picket-
ing. The three possibilities are that the states have jurisdiction over none, all or
some of the activities falling within this middle group.
Support for the proposition that the states have been ousted of jurisdiction
even over activities unprotected and unprohibited by the Taft-Hartley Act
may be found in the Supreme Court's most recent statement on pre-empticn
under the Taft-Hartley Act, Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board." The Court
declared that the Taft-Hartley Act pre-empted the field which it covered, 7
and stated that its coverage was the field of labor relations to the full ex-
tent of Congress' power to regulate in that area. 8 As if to nail down the ob-
vious inference, the Court clearly implied that the states had jurisdiction to
regulate labor relations in interstate commerce only where jurisdiction was
ceded to them by the federal government.59 Since it can hardly be contended
that Congress does not have the power to regulate stranger picketing, it would
follow that the states could not regulate such picketing whether or not Congress
had seen fit to place it within one of the sections of the Taft-Hartley Act."
The narrow holding of the Bus Employees case, however, was that a strike for
53Hoover Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1614, 1621 (1950).
51 See Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 Ind. L.J. 319, 328-30
(1951).
5 Petro, State Jurisdiction to Control Recognition Picketing, 2 Lab. L.J. 883 (1951);
Lauritzen, The Organizational Picket Line, 3 Stanford L. Rev. 413 (1951). But cf. Cox, The
Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 Ind. L.J. 319, 327-28 (1951).
56340 U.S. 383 (1951). 5 Ibid., at 391.
57 Ibid., at 397-98. 11 Ibid., at 397-98.
60 A rather involved argument has been made urging that the particular field of minority
and stranger picketing has been pre-empted. See Feldblum, Some Aspects of Minority Union
Picketing in New York, 20 Fordham L. Rev. 176, 194-96 (1951). But cf. Cox and Seidman,
Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 211, 225-27 (1950).
[Vol. 20
higher wages by utility employees was a protected activity under Section 7, and
that state regulation of such a strike conflicted with federal law. It may be
argued, therefore, that the pre-emption dictum does not apply to middle group
activities because the Court was not confronted with a case involving such ac-
tivities and there is no explicit indication that it intended its language to apply
to them. On the other hand, the fact that the Court did not rest its holding on
the narrower ground that the state regulation involved was in conflict with fed-
eral law may be said to underscore the significance of its broad pre-emption
language.
The view that the states may regulate any activity which is neither protected
by Section 7 nor unfair under Section 8 may be supported by language in an
earlier Supreme Court case, Briggs-StrattonA' The employees had engaged in a
series of unannounced work stoppages-the "quickie" strike. The Court found
that this activity was not protected by Section 7, and in upholding the right of
the state to enjoin such practices Justice Jackson stated:
It seems to us clear ... that the state may police these strike activities... because
"Congress has not made such employee and union conduct as is involved in this case
subject to regulation by the Federal Board." There is no existing or possible conflict or
overlapping between the authority of the Federal and State Boards, because the
Federal Board has no authority either to investigate, approve or forbid the union con-
duct in question. This conduct is governable by the state or it is entirely ungoverned.5
This language may be interpreted as affirming the existence of state jurisdiction
over all activities falling within the middle group. In context, however, it ap-
pears that Justice Jackson may have been referring not to all middle group
activities but only to "coercive tactics."
However, as to coercive tactics in labor controversies, we have said ... that "Congress
designedly left open an area for state control" and that "the intention of Congress to
exclude States from exercising their police power must be clearly manifested."' '
Another statement in the opinion, though inaccurate, indicates that the phrase
"coercive tactics" was used to refer to the use of illegal means in a labor dispute,
as distinguished from the pursuit of an illegal objective by lawful means.64
Arguably, then, action neither prohibited nor protected by the Taft-Hartley
Act would be subject to state regulation only when illegal means were employed,
for in such cases "the intention of Congress to exclude the States from exercising
their police power must be clearly manifested." The implication is that where
61 Briggs-Stratton, 336 U.S. 245 (1949). For various reasons, a dictum in Algoma Plywood
& Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 301, 305 (1949), which
also supports this proposition, would probably carry little weight in pre-emption arguments
today. See Cox and Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 211, 223-24
(1950).
62 Briggs-Stratton, 336 U.S. 245, 254 (1949). 63 Ibid., at 253.
64 "While the Federal Board is empowered to forbid a strike, when and because its purpose
is one that the Federal Act made illegal, it has been given no power to forbid one because its
method is illegal." Ibid. Cf. § 8(b)(1)(A) of Taft-Hartey.
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only the objective of the union and not the means employed was prescribed by
state policy, it would be unnecessary to show a specific intent to exclude the
states from jurisdiction; exclusion would follow from Congress' "intent" (recog-
nized in the Bus Employees case) to pre-empt the field. Presumably a due process
test would prevent the states from breaking down the means-objective distinc-
tion and expanding their own jurisdiction by simply designating as illegal
means all activities which they desired to regulate.
It is questionable, however, whether even a flexible due process test could
prevent the breakdown of a distinction which seems little more than a matter
of definition. For example, the secondary boycott, an illegal means at common
law, is defined in terms of objectives in Taft-Hartley. 5 As regards stranger
picketing, it could as well be argued (a) that peaceful picketing is a traditionally
acceptable means and that its use has been held protected where the objective
is, e.g., higher wages, and that therefore, if peaceful picketing is condemned
when its objective is organization, the objective sought and not the means em-
ployed must have dictated the changed result; or (b) that an attempt to organ-
ize workers by, e.g., writing letters, would plainly be legal and that therefore an
attempt to attain the same objective by another means, e.g., peaceful picketing,
must be condemned, if it is condemned, only because of the means employed.
It would be undesirable for such verbal distinctions to be controlling and it
would be unfortunate if Briggs-Stratton were read so as to require this result. If
Briggs-Stratton were so read and the argument that stranger picketing involved
only the use of the legal means of peaceful picketing were used to preclude
state regulation of stranger picketing (as would seem likely in view of the
Gazzam decision), it would lead to the anomalous result that activity which had
been thought so inconsistent with the policy of free choice as to merit exclusion
from the protection of Section 7 would not only be immune from employer re-
prisal (the employer could hardly discharge pickets who were not his em-
ployees), but would be free from state regulation as well. Such a result could be
justified as a matter of policy only if a very great premium were set upon uni-
formity in regulating labor-management relations.
Arguments for uniformity are, of course, easy to make. It has been persua-
sively contended, for example, that the federal government should retain full re-
sponsibility in areas where it has enacted comprehensive regulations even at the
cost of tolerating a few overlooked abuses, and that the cost to the community
"of tolerating the abuses pending Congressional action would seem to be far less
than the expense of litigation and patch-work policies.'66 Where, however, an
activity challenges the fundamental policy of federal labor legislation, as stran-
ger picketing does, it is highly undesirable that the abuse be tolerated even tem-
porarily. Although it would be anomalous if a matter central to the activities of
65 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, at § 8 (b)(4) (A), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 158 (b)(4)(A) (Supp., 1951).
Cox and Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 Harv. L. Aev. 211, 230 (1950).
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unions and the ultimate policy of the Taft-Hartley Act were left to the vagaries
of over forty-eight jurisdictions, 67 it would be at least equally anomalous if no
agency had authority to regulate activity which violated the clearly enunciated
policy of the Act.6
Consistency with the underlying policy of the Act and desirable uniformity of
administration could both be attained if Section 8(b)(1)(A) were used to regu-
late stranger picketing. It has already been urged that the NLRB's interpreta-
tion of that section is not so settled as to preclude its use for such a purpose.
If, however, the NLRB does not change what appears to be its present inter-
pretation of Section 8(b)(1)(A), amendment of the Taft-Hartley Act would be
the proper way to achieve uniform policing of stranger picketing. Meanwhile,
though the cases may cast substantial theoretical doubt on the states' jurisdic-
tion to regulate stranger picketing for organization and recognition, pre-emption
arguments will be unlikely to commend themselves to state courts impressed
with the coercive nature of such picketing.69
THE ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIMS ACT OF 1940
ASSIGNEE v. SURETY
The Assignment of Claims Act of 1940' was passed for the purpose of giving
protection to banks, trust companies and other lending institutions engaged in
the financing of defense contracts. Formerly, assignment of claims against the
government had been barred. 2 The Act of 1940 enabled lenders to accept as se-
curity assignments by contractors of payments due and to become due under
such contracts. Banking interests attribute the success of the World. War II
V-loan program to the liberalizing effect of the 1940 Act.3
67 Ibid., at 228-30.
68 Petro, State Jurisdiction to Control Recognition Picketing, 2 Lab. L.J. 883 (1951).
61 See, e.g., State v. Dobson, 245 P. 2d 903, 923 (1952).
154 Stat. 1029 (1940), as amended, 31 U.S.C.A. § 203 (Supp., 1951).
2 9 Stat. 41 (1846), 31 U.S.C.A. § 203 (1927); 12 Stat. 596 (1862), 41 U.S.C.A. § 15 (1952).
3 See Kupfer, The Federal Assignment of Claims Act Comes of Age, 125 N.Y.B.J., Nos. 107,
108 and 109 (1951). In 1951, the Act of 1940 was reconsidered by Congress in the light of the
new financing made necessary by the Korean situation. Under the impact of two "adverse"
opinions by the Comptroller General, the Act of 1940 was amended, 31 U.S.C.A. § 203 (Supp.,
1951). The Comptroller had advised that the government could recapture payments made to an
assignee-bank if the contractor failed to pay withholding taxes or make social security con-
tributions, or in case of price revision under the contract. Although in no single reported case
had the government made such recapture from a financing institution, and in spite of the
questionable validity of the Comptroller's opinion (cf. United States v. Hadden, 192 F. 2d
327 [C.A. 6th, 1951]), it was feared that the effect of these rulings might be to deter lenders
from participating in the current mobilization program. Accordingly, the Act of 1940 was
amended so as to overcome the Comptroller's decisions. The Amendment of 1951 provides,
in effect, that the government may not recover any part of payments made to an assignee-
lender after July 1, 1950, for debts of the contractor arising from or independently of contracts
awarded by certain government agencies to be designated by the President in time of emer-
gency. See Cable, 1951 Assignment of Claims Amendment; Boon to Government Contract
Financing, 68 Banking L.J. 437 (1951).
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